Summary
There has been an active on-going debate on the appropriate role of IMF lending in resolving international financial crises. On one side are those who favour the IMF playing the role of pseudo international lender of last resort. On the other are those who would favour the debtor country and its private creditors, rather than the IMF, shouldering more of the burden when crises strike.
The balance between these arguments requires us to weigh the benefits of public policy intervention in mitigating an international capital market externality against the costs of distorting The following results stand out. First, returns to creditor banks are indeed (statistically significantly) greater than can be explained by general market movements around the time of IMF bail-outs. Second, these boosts to the market valuation of banks are large quantitativelyfor around ten interventions, they exceed $4 billion. Third, these excess returns are greater for big-ticket IMF packages and especially when IMF loans have been subsequently augmented.
Fourth, these valuation responses are larger than can be accounted for by the potentially welfare-enhancing effect of IMF loans in offsetting international capital market frictions.
Taken together, this evidence is consistent with a generic creditor moral hazard story. The response of market prices is consistent with increased incentives to take on emerging market risks, in response to large-scale IMF interventions. The costs of crisis are clear, immediate and
Introduction
Since the Mexican crisis in 1995, there have been at least a further dozen systemic international financial crises in emerging market economies. If anything, the incidence and virulence of these crises appears to be increasing. Against that background, there has been an active on-going debate on the appropriate role of IMF lending in resolving such crises (eg, Eichengreen (2002) ).
On the one side are those that favour the IMF playing the role of pseudo-international lender of last resort in those situations (eg, Fischer (2000) ). On the other are those who would favour the debtor country and its private creditors, rather than the IMF, shouldering more of the burden when crises strike (eg, Meltzer (2000) ).
The balance between these arguments requires us to weigh the benefits of public policy intervention in mitigating an international capital market externality, against the costs of distorting risk-taking incentives through such intervention. In an international context, the incentives in question are those of debtors when framing policy decisions (so-called debtor moral hazard) and/or private creditors when framing investment decisions (creditor moral hazard).
Taking a quantitative view of the importance of (creditor and debtor) moral hazard is, however, far from straightforward. To date, conclusions from the empirical literature have been at best mixed; they are reviewed in Section 2. Truman (2001) summarises as follows:
'These [moral hazard arguments] are conceptually consistent, but the advocates..
.have yet to demonstrate that moral hazard...has increased significantly since the Mexican rescue in 1995. In my experience, unsubstantiated theoretical propositions and anecdotes provide an insufficient intellectual foundation for dramatic changes in international financial policy.' This paper takes up Truman's challenge. It considers some fresh evidence on the extent of the creditor moral hazard associated with recent large-scale IMF bail-outs. It builds on earlier contributions by using a different data set and stricter identifying assumptions to test a sequenced set of necessary conditions for the presence of moral hazard. In this way, it is able to reach cleaner and, we think, stronger conclusions than those unearthed in the previous literature. The empirical methodology, identifying restrictions and empirical results are discussed in Sections 3-7. Section 8 concludes with some policy implications.
Existing literature
The theoretical literature on moral hazard has, of course, a long intellectual history (eg, Grossmann and Hart (1983) ). More recently, the issue has been explored analytically in an international context by, among others, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001) , Miller and Ghosal (2002) , Mussa (2002) and Haldane, Irwin and Saporta (2003) . All insurance contracts, IMF or otherwise, possess some degree of moral hazard. So the key issue becomes -how much is too much? To answer that question we need quantitative, empirical evidence on the importance of moral hazard.
To date, that empirical evidence has been far from conclusive and there have been only a handful of studies. Broadly, two approaches have been pursued. The first approach considers the average size of the redistribution of resources from the official sector to the debtor country and/or its private creditors through the provision of IMF loans. It has tended to find that these redistributions are sufficiently small in quantitative terms, relative to the costs incurred by debtors and creditors at crisis time, that they are unlikely to have induced significant moral hazard.
For example, Lane and Phillips (2000) consider the size of IMF loans in relation to debtor country GDP and external debt. They conclude that loans have in the past been too small to have reassured creditors that they would be repaid with certainty. Indeed, it is argued that in most crisis cases creditors have sustained non-trivial losses, while debtors have undergone severe output contractions, both of which in financial terms far exceeded the potential value of IMF loans (Mussa (2002) ). Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001) consider the cost, rather than size, of IMF loans. Specifically, they calculate the subsidy implicit in IMF packages -that is, whether the interest rate charged on IMF loans covers the associated credit risk. This credit risk is mitigated by the fact that the IMF is a preferred creditor and, at least historically, has almost always been repaid. For that reason, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer use US Treasury yields as a benchmark interest rate. Comparing these safe yields with IMF borrowing costs, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer argue that the extent of the financial redistribution resulting from IMF bail-outs is small and so unlikely, by itself, to have induced significant moral hazard.
These studies get at one dimension of moral hazard. But they are partial in several respects.
First, calculated average subsidies may not be a good reflection of the marginal effects of IMF intervention. For example, at the height of crisis, an average risk-free rate is unlikely to be a good proxy for the true marginal cost of capital for a country, even once allowance is made for the IMF's preferred creditor status. It is these marginal costs which affect future borrowing decisions and hence moral hazard. Second, relatedly, these studies do not assess how forward-looking incentives (to borrow and lend) may have been affected by IMF intervention.
They measure static redistributions of wealth between parties, whereas the essence of moral hazard is a dynamic effect on future behaviour by these parties.
Third, as Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001) discuss, a financial redistribution from the official sector to debtors and/or private creditors is only one of the potential moral hazard channels. Even if the debtor repays its loan to the IMF, there is the potentially distorting effect of the financial redistribution from debtor country taxpayers to private creditors associated with (and facilitated by) IMF bail-outs -an indirect moral hazard channel. This indirect moral hazard is associated specifically with creditors, since it is they who benefit from this redistribution, relative to the counterfactual of no IMF intervention.
The second empirical approach to assessing moral hazard has attempted to remedy some of these shortfalls. It has looked at the behaviour of observed country borrowing costs around the time of IMF interventions. Country spreads (marginal borrowing costs) are likely to better capture the marginal effects of IMF intervention. And they are explicitly forward-looking, so better capture effects on future (borrowing and lending) incentives. Haldane (1999) considers the wedge between IMF borrowing costs and country-risk adjusted spreads at the time of eight IMF bail-outs, finding an implied IMF subsidy somewhat greater than that in Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001) . Lane and Phillips (2000) consider the behaviour of country spreads around the time of 22
IMF interventions between 1994-99. They find that few of these IMF interventions led to a consistent and decisive lowering of spreads, which they interpret as evidence against moral hazard.
The studies by Zhang (1999), Dell'Arricia, Schnabel and Zettelmeyer (2002) , McBrady and Seasholes (2000) and Kamin (2002) Taken together, this evidence is rather mixed. But it suggests that, at worst, moral hazard has been a transient, historical feature of the international monetary system, rather than a current and on-going concern. There are several conceptual reasons, however, for questioning that consensus.
First, using market spreads poses an identification problem. It will pick up the effects of a financial redistribution from the official sector to debtors and/or private creditors. Such a redistribution would tend to lower risks for both the debtor and its creditors and so would lower the equilibrium cost of borrowing. But it is less clear how a redistribution from the debtor to private creditors -the indirect moral hazard channel discussed by Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001) -would affect spreads. It might potentially result in a rise in spreads if the upshot is that debtor creditworthiness is put at risk. In other words, tests based on observed spreads might be poor at detecting moral hazard in general, and creditor moral hazard in particular. This might help explain the mixed messages from previous studies using spreads.
Second, as Dell'Arricia et al discuss, there is a further identification problem when interpreting movements in market spreads around the time of IMF bail-outs as a signal of moral hazard. A fall in spreads is consistent with moral hazard. Equally, however, it is consistent with the IMF playing a positive role in offsetting an international capital market externality, caused by private capital becoming over-priced in crisis periods (see, eg, Morris and Shin (1999) ). Resolving that identification problem -do IMF interventions correct over-pricing or induce under-pricing? -calls for stricter identifying assumptions.
Third, existing studies attempt to explain whether IMF bail-outs lower borrowing costs and compress spreads looking across all emerging markets. But in practice, bail-outs might have idiosyncratic rather than generic effects -for example, because the bail-out is motivated by 'geopolitical' factors (Mussa (2002) ). In these cases, the borrowing costs and incentives of the intervened country will be affected, but costs and incentives in emerging markets generally may not. That means looking at several IMF events (rather than any one) and assessing country-specific (as well as generic emerging market) movements at those times. Both generic and idiosyncratic effects are potentially incentive-distorting and hence costly in a welfare sense.
Method
The tests of creditor moral hazard developed below attempt to address some of these methodological problems. First, we use an event-study method, as with most of the existing literature. But we consider a wider range of IMF events than previous studies. The sample covers all of the recent large-scale capital account crises in emerging markets between 1995-2002. (1) This gives the tests extra degrees of freedom and allows us to track incentives for risk-taking over time.
Second, we focus explicitly on creditor moral hazard. We do this by looking at the effects of IMF interventions on the market valuation of creditors, rather than on debtors' cost of capital.
Specifically, we look at the response of creditor banks' share prices following an IMF event.
(2)
Subject to some identifying restrictions, discussed below, this measure ought to capture the forward-looking effects of any financial redistribution either from the official sector, or from the debtor, to private creditors. In other words, it captures both of the creditor moral hazard channels identified by Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001) . We are not aware of previous studies to have attempted to identify separately creditor moral hazard; nor studies to have used the information in creditors' market valuations to capture IMF-induced moral hazard effects.
Up front, however, it is worth emphasising two important qualifications of our analysis. These caveats apply equally to all other studies of moral hazard, but that does not detract from their importance. First, none of the tests presented here measure incentives and risk-taking behaviour directly. Rather they measure the effects of IMF loans on the net worth of banks -and hence, indirectly, on these banks' potential risk-taking behaviour.
In effect, what we measure is one step removed from observable risk-taking behaviour. The tests are necessary conditions for the presence of moral hazard, rather than sufficient ones. Our study is one step closer to observed
(1) Section 4 discusses these events.
risk-taking behaviour than earlier studies. And provided risk-taking behaviour adapts in response to price signals, there ought to be a direct correspondence between effects on banks' net worth and their risk-taking behaviour. But this hypothesis is not directly tested here.
Second, we measure the change rather than the level of risk-taking over time. In judging the efficacy of IMF liquidity intervention, the degree of distortion to decision-making is likely to be at least as important as its rate of change. For that reason, our public policy conclusions must necessarily be qualified.
A simple framework can be used to illustrate the main arguments. Let V i denote the market value of bank i. This is given by the discounted value of bank i's (current and future) assets net of its liabilities. Denote liabilities, L i . Assets comprise a set of loans, A i j , to countries j=0,…m, each with probability of default, λ i j .
(3) So: with IMF intervention would be expected -for example, through a Q-theory of investment -to result in banks investing further in intervened country assets. In other words, a rise in V i (and hence Q) provides a diagnostic on incentives to take additional risk -or creditor moral hazard.
14 (3) Implicitly, we are assuming 100% loss in the event of default. Alternatively, we can think of λ i j as the product of default probability and loss given default. For simplicity, we have ignored time-discounting in the present value relationship, equation (1). Now define a sequence of IMF intervention events, ε k j , where j denotes the country which is the subject of the bailout and k=1,…p is the number of events. Note that a country may be subject to more than one IMF intervention and some countries may be subject to no intervention; this is the case over our sample.
Within this set-up, we consider a set of nested tests which impose (increasingly stringent) restrictions on equation (1). These sequenced tests are necessary conditions for the presence of creditor moral hazard. Table A summarises the restrictions implied by these tests. Tests 1 and 2 assess whether there is a significant response of creditor banks' valuations to an IMF intervention. Test 1 is performed on unconditional bank equity returns (∂V i ). Test 2 looks at conditional bank returns (∂W i ), conditioning on movements in the overall equity market (Ω). The test is whether these returns are significantly positive following an IMF bail-out
. This restriction is a necessary condition for the presence of creditor moral hazard -that is, IMF interventions lower default probabilities on (current and expected future) emerging market loans in such a way that they boost creditor banks' market valuations.
Tests 3 and 4 decompose the market valuation response following an IMF intervention using data on country loan exposures of banks. Specifically, using banks' country exposure data, it is possible to identify the effects of an IMF intervention on banks with large exposures to the intervened country (Test 3); and those with a large portfolio of emerging markets assets generally (Test 4). These are, in effect, direct tests of restrictions on the default probabilities, λ i j , for different types of banks' loans (∂ λ i j / ∂ ε k <0).
Tests 5 and 6 make further conditioning assumptions to ensure that our inferences about moral hazard are robust. They take seriously the potential identification problem of IMF intervention lowering the probability of default for welfare-improving reasons, rather than because of moral hazard. To control for the welfare-enhancing effect of bail-outs on default probabilities, we use as proxies the observed change in borrowing costs for the intervened country (Test 5) or for emerging markets generally (Test 6), adjusted for the credit exposure of each individual bank to the crisis country or to emerging markets in general. So, in effect, we assume that all of the fall in observed borrowing costs is the result of welfare-improving IMF intervention, rather than moral hazard, acting on the portfolio of country assets held by the bank. We then assess whether there is any response in creditor banks' valuations following an IMF intervention over and above these effects -whether conditional default probabilities, denoted µ i j , are significantly affected by the sequence of IMF interventions (∂ µ i j /∂ ε k <0). This is clearly a very strict test of creditor moral hazard, which loads the dice heavily against finding such effects. 
These restrictions on equation (1) are tested using the following econometric specification:
where y ik is the return to bank i associated with event k; A ik j=k are the loans by bank i at the time of event k, to the country j that is the subject of the IMF intervention, country k; A ik j≠k are the bank loans by bank i at the time of event k to all other emerging markets countries that are potentially subject to IMF intervention (j ≠ k); S k k are borrowing spreads for country k (the object of the IMF intervention) and S k EME are borrowing spreads for emerging markets generally, both at the time of event k.
Tests 1 and 2 impose β 1 = β 2 = β 3 = β 4 = 0, and test whether β 0 = 0, on a conditional and unconditional basis. Test 3 relaxes the assumption on β 1 and tests whether β 1 = 0. Test 4 does the same for β 2 . Tests 5 and 6 relax, in turn, the restrictions on β 3 and β 4 , so as to reassess the restrictions on β 1 and β 2 respectively, on a conditional basis. The econometric methodology involved running equation (2) as a pooled OLS regression, thereby exploiting both the time (IMF-event) and cross-sectional (bank-specific) dimensions of the data. In addition, we also ran some panel regressions, which allowed for event-specific fixed effects. Both are reported below.
To summarise, our methodology adds value over previous studies in five respects: first, it considers a wider set of IMF intervention events; second, it looks explicitly and directly at creditor-side responses; third, it conditions these creditor-side responses on the size of the banks' exposures; fourth, it allows us to decouple 'systemic' from 'idiosyncratic' moral hazard events;
and fifth, it conditions on factors which allow us to distinguish the welfare-enhancing effect of IMF intervention on default probabilities from their welfare-depleting moral hazard effect.
Taken together, these restrictions give a cleaner -and hence hopefully more compelling -test of the importance of creditor moral hazard.
Data
Estimating equation (2) requires data on IMF-intervention events, cumulative returns to bank shares around the IMF-event window (on a conditional and unconditional basis), credit exposures of these banks to crisis countries and to emerging markets in general, and emerging market borrowing spreads around the event window. We discuss these data in turn.
(4)
Identification of IMF events
The selection of IMF events is based largely on IMF press releases announcing significant country packages or policy changes. The events are typically the announcement of a bail-out 
(4) Further details on the data can be obtained from the authors on request.
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(5) The source for the events and package sizes are IMF press releases, while the quota data is available from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. The events we choose differ from those in Lane and Phillips (2000) . For example, Lane and
Phillips use multiple event-dates associated with a single IMF intervention, whereas here we focus on the key announcement event. By way of framing, Chart 1 plots the average response of both country and emerging market spreads over the five-day period centred around each of our IMF-intervention events. (6) In the majority of cases, the response in spreads is correctly signednegative -and in many cases sizable. The average fall in country-specific spreads over the sample is 6.4%; and the average fall in emerging market spreads is 2.9%.
This suggests that, unlike in Lane and Phillips (2000) , an alternative choice of IMF-intervention events is capable of delivering correctly-signed and economically significant spreads responses.
As these responses capture the change in risk-taking incentives, they also suggest that moral hazard may have been accumulating during the latter part of the 1990s and into the 21st century and has been a persistent phenomenon. Both are contrary to previous evidence. Most previous studies have also stopped after looking at spreads responses. Here we choose to use further data and restrictions to refine our conclusions. 
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(6) For emerging market spreads, we used JP Morgan's EMBI for overall emerging market exposures and the country components of the EMBI Global for the country-specific spread measures; where available, we extended the country data for Thailand and Korea forward by using the respective Chase Manhattan Bond indices.
Bank returns
In principle, it would have been desirable to look at the share price reactions of all major creditor banks with emerging market exposures, on an institution-by-institution basis. Unfortunately, bank-specific data on emerging market exposures are not publically available for a broad international cross-section of creditor banks. We do, however, have access to confidential Bank of England data on UK banks' country exposures. There are seven UK banks with significant emerging market exposures -HSBC, Standard Chartered, Barclays, Lloyds-TSB, National
Westminister, the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Abbey National. Daily share prices for these banks are readily available. 
Bank's portfolio exposures
The data on UK banks' exposures to emerging market countries come from the Bank of England.
There are several potential measures of the exposure of a banking system to emerging markets.
For the UK banks, we use the consolidated exposures of all UK-owned banks in all currencies to developing countries. This is probably the most comprehensive measure of banks' overseas exposure available. In addition to cross-border lending by banks' head offices, it includes lending by foreign branches and subsidiaries of UK banks, including lending in local currency.
In the regression analysis, we measure exposures in the quarter preceding each event to overcome any potential simultaneity problems. These exposure data need to be scaled by some measure of balance sheet size. Two obvious scalars are total bank assets and total bank capital. Both yielded very similar conclusions and in what follows we report the results for UK banks using (tier 1 plus tier 2) capital as a scalar.
(7) We also experimented with a sample of creditor banks grouped together on a national (rather than institution-specific) basis. The 20 countries considered were Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the UK and the US. These are the countries whose banks have the largest exposures to the emerging markets according to data from the Bank for International Settlements. We do not have institution-specific exposure data for these countries, however, and for this and other data reasons, the results using aggregated national data appeared to be less robust. In what follows, we focus on the UK banks' results.
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(8) Local currency lending by foreign branches and subsidiaries of developed country banks has grown in importance rapidly over recent years; for UK banks, local currency lending is currently around half of total foreign exposures.
5.

Assessing bank returns
One measure we consider is cumulated unconditional returns to the creditor banks following each IMF event (Test 1 from Table A) . We choose an event window of two days either side of the event data, so that the LHS variable is the cumulative five-day equity price return for each of the UK banks. (9) A second, more sophisticated measure involves controlling for the performance of the equity market as a whole, so constructing a measure of 'excess' or conditional returns (Test 2 from Table A) . (10) To construct conditional returns, we experimented with several different methods for calculating the market beta for each bank. The simplest approach is simply to fix beta at unity across all banks. We also, however, considered estimating betas using the following equation on monthly data over the period January 1992 to July 2002 for each bank:
where ∆ bank it is the percentage change in the equity price of UK bank i and ∆ market t is the percentage change in the overall UK equity market index. We estimated betas based on regressions over the entire ten-year period, as well as moving averages of 100 days prior to a given event. The estimated average betas for our sample of UK banks were very consistent, ranging between 1.2-1.6, while the betas based on moving averages had a higher variability between 0.7 and 2.5. We take as our benchmark case {a i =0, β i =1}, though the different methods Charts 2 and 3 plot, respectively, conditional (excess) and unconditional (absolute) UK bank returns across the IMF-intervention events. For each event, we identify the mean (averaging across UK banks) and the high-low range for UK banks. For most (but not all) events, the (9) This event window appeared to give the most robust results. We experimented with several other (shorter and longer) event windows. Using these did not materially affect the qualitative conclusions. In a number of crisis cases IMF intervention may have been anticipated more than two days prior to the main IMF announcement. If this is the case, our estimates will be a lower bound on the size of the equity market 'news' associated with IMF bail-outs. There is an obvious tension here in using a longer event window. This will capture a greater proportion of the anticipation effect.
It will also, however, risk contaminating the asset price response with extraneous news, unrelated to the IMF intervention. Using a five-day window is a compromise that will tend, if anything, to bias our results away from finding significant moral hazard effects. 22 (12) The fact that all events do not exhibit positive returns is evidence that we have not 'cherry-picked' events with the largest response. 
(13) We test this formally below.
Fourth, a clearer-still indication of potential moral hazard is found by looking in the last column of Table C , which compares the rise in the market valuation of UK banks to their combined credit exposure to the crisis country. A ratio in excess of unity would be clear evidence that banks were being 'overcompensated' for the country risk on their existing portfolio. In other words, it would indicate a boost to banks' valuations greater than can be explained by a fall in default probabilities from unity to zero on their country portfolio. This is the case for half of the top ten events. This evidence is broadly consistent with a generic creditor moral hazard story.
Fifth, many of the programmes in Table C excessive risk-taking has not subsided over time, contrary to some other evidence (Kamin (2002)) but consistent with the evidence from spreads. (15) 
6.
Using exposure restrictions
We now refine our tests by using data on banks' loan exposure to the country that is the subject of the IMF intervention and to emerging market countries in general. These exposure restrictions can be tested by examining the coefficients β 1 and β 2 respectively in equation (2) (Tests 3 and 4
in Table A ). The results for UK excess and absolute returns are shown in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. Regression 1 shows the tests of β 1 ; regression 2 shows the tests of β 2 ; while regression 3 shows the results with both country-specific and emerging market exposures included (β 1 and β 2 ).
(16) Regressions 4, 5 and 6 introduce the exposure-weighted changes in credit spreads -our control variables for the welfare-improving effects of an IMF intervention.
Regressions 7 and 8 include additionally the headline figure for the IMF loan scaled by the country's quota (Package k ), to test formally whether larger packages induce larger responses.
We estimate these regressions first using pooled OLS and then including event-specific fixed effects, which allow for idiosyncratic effects on mean returns across each event. β 2 is correctly signed and statistically significant at the 95% level (for abnormal returns) and (16) We also tried a variable capturing a bank's exposure to other countries in the same region as the affected country, to control for fundamental spill-over linkages. The regional exposure variable was, however, never significant in the regressions.
(17) Event 12 is the only 'reverse' moral hazard event in the sample, so we have reversed the sign of the share price and credit spread changes. Also, event 12 (Russia's default in 1998) and event 14 (US ratification of the increased quota) are dummied-out of regressions which included country spread data or the Package variable. A larger part of the explanation is, however, likely to lie in a generic creditor moral hazard story.
IMF intervention in one country may be perceived as increasing the probability of future IMF intervention in other emerging markets. This would then tend to boost most the valuations of those banks with the largest (relative) emerging market portfolios overall. This is also consistent with the results from the final column of Table C , which indicates an 'overcompensation' of banks for the country-specific exposure they are assuming in a number of cases.
Controlling for spreads
So far, we have uncovered statistically significant evidence that IMF bail-outs boost expected excess returns to creditor banks, especially those holding large emerging market portfolios.
This suggests increased incentives to take on emerging market risk. An alternative interpretation is, however, that IMF interventions may be helping offset an overpricing problem in international capital markets, thereby lowering the probability of sovereign default in a welfare-enhancing (19) Banks with large exposures relative to capital also tend to be the biggest lenders in absolute terms. way. This identification problem, discussed in Dell'Arricia et al (2002) , can be tackled by including debtor country spreads in the regression, on a country-specific or emerging market basis. We control for the potentially welfare-enhancing nature of IMF interventions by weighting changes in country spreads (or emerging market spreads) by their share in a bank's loan portfolio. (20) This provides an upper-bound measure of the expected boost to banks' valuations that would result from a welfare-enhancing liquidity intervention.
Regressions 4, 5 and 6 in Tables D and E show the results of adding country and emerging market portfolio weighted spreads to regression 3 (Tests 5 and 6 in Table A ). The coefficients on β 3 and β 4
are both correctly -negatively -signed and in some cases are significant. Controlling in this way does not, however, reduce the size and significance of the emerging market portfolio coefficient, β 2 .
Excess returns remain largest among UK banks with the highest emerging market exposures relative to capital. This evidence supports a creditor moral hazard story, as it attributes all of the movement in spreads to a welfare-improving risk-reduction rather than moral hazard.
Finally, regressions 7 and 8 include the headline IMF loan package as an additional explanatory
factor. It appears to have considerable explanatory power over bank (especially absolute) returns, independently of other factors, consistent with the evidence from Table C . This find also supports a moral hazard story.
Conclusions
Existing empirical evidence on the moral hazard implications of IMF bail-outs is sparse. This paper has presented some new data and used some new restrictions to reassess this question. This new approach allows us to identify risk-taking incentives more precisely than earlier studies, while at the same time controlling for alternative potential explanations. Taken together, this makes for a cleaner test.
Using this approach, we have found some support for the moral hazard hypothesis. This evidence is weak for some IMF-intervention events. But for a significant number of these events, UK banks exhibit abnormal returns exceeding 1%. This sounds like small beer. But it is equivalent to an increase in the market valuation of UK banks of around $3.5-$4 billion. These events are often associated with big-ticket IMF loans and are not confined to the distant past. Interventions in Argentina, Turkey and Brazil since 2000 all rank in the moral hazard top five.
These excess returns are concentrated among those banks with the largest emerging market portfolios overall, relative to their capital. IMF interventions appear to raise the expected valuation of all emerging market loans, not only those of the intervened country. This is consistent with a generic form of creditor moral hazard. This effect remains significant even once we control for the potentially welfare-enhancing effect of IMF intervention in correcting overpricing problems in capital markets.
Moral hazard problems are of course a matter of degree. Against that backdrop, these caveats are worth bearing in mind. First, our tests measure changes in moral hazard rather than the absolute level of risk-taking by creditors. Second, our tests are necessary rather than sufficient conditions for moral hazard; they measure incentives for excessive risk-taking, rather than the risk-taking itself.
And third, it has proven harder to find similar-sized effects looking across banking systems in other (than UK) countries on an aggregated basis, perhaps due to data deficiencies. Future work might attempt to address these potential shortcomings. Nonetheless, the evidence presented here suggests that concerns about moral hazard should weigh more heavily than the existing literature would have us believe.
